The 5^th meeting of the Association of European Senates
Prague, October 6. - 8. 2003

Minutes of the Meeting

Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues, Dear Guests, let me welcome you on the premises of the Senate.

     The music you heard is the fanfare from a composition by the Czech Baroque composer Vejvanovský and is used to summon the senators to vote.

     Three years ago the President of the Senate of the French Republic Christian Poncelet initiated a meeting of several Presidents of the European Senates in Paris to found this Association and outline the trends of its activities. It happened in November 2000. Since then the delegations of European Senates have met already four times. The number of the represented second chambers was changing. In 2002 the second chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the newly reconstructed second chamber of the Russian Federation joined our Association. On the other hand, we have lost the Croatian regional house that in 2001 ceased to be a member of our Association due to extensive constitutional changes. At the same time we have information that foundation of the second chamber is contemplated in Ukraine, discussions in this respect are held also in Slovakia and in Hungary. Many existing second chambers undergo reforms changing their competencies and the manner of establishment.As a matter of fact the issue of the second chambers is discussed also in the countries that have abolished them. In short, the second chamber is a relatively unstable, changeable component in the European parliamentary systems.

     Let me recall for those of you who did not participate in all the meetings the topics these meetings were focused on.

     The first host of the meeting was the French Senate, where we discussed the relation between the second chambers and local governments.

     The second meeting in Brussels concentrated on the impact of the activities of the second chambers on the quality of legislation.

     The third topic we dealt with in Ljubljana included the links between bicameralism, democracy and the role of the civic society.

     And finally, the fourth meeting in Madrid focused on the control functions of the second chambers in general and partly also on their specific relation to the governments that act in the Council of the European Union as the European legislator.

     It is rather signifying that there is no similar association of the European houses, i.e. the first or lower chambers, but only the Association of Senates, whatever they are called. Undoubtedly it relates also to the fact that the existence and meaningfulness of the senates or the second chambers is from time to time questioned. I would say that this was or is the case of most European countries where the second chambers exist. Sometimes the criticism focuses on their very existence, sometimes on their particular manifestations, composition, activity, on a certain decision. Some European countries even abolished the second chambers in the past. Apart from the already mentioned Croatia it was the case of Denmark in 1953 and Sweden at the end of the sixties.

     Still I would insist on the fact that our Association has not been established as a sort of organization of defence of institutions recorded in the Red List of Threatened Species and our meetings should not be viewed as a manifestation of those who fight for survival. This certainly is not the case. Defensive approach has never been a characteristic feature of our meetings and we as the hosts of the Prague meeting shall do our best to prevent such approach from prevailing also this time.

     This determination of ours is reflected also in the selection of the topic of your today's speeches and the following discussion. This particular topic should clarify that the second chamber is not an institution which should or should have to face the attacks of opponents, if it is well constructed and fits in the constitutional framework. By this I have in mind mainly that it should be suitably established and balanced with regard to the first chamber.

     Nevertheless, once speaking of defence, it should be the defence of bicameralism as an expression of a certain belief in a good government. The defence of such a manner of government that offers space for plurality of opinions and prefers a profound repeated consideration of decisions to a mere expedition, rather than defence of individual senates. For we may similarly rightfully insist that the first chamber should also be suitably constructed with regard to the senate and if it is not the case its existence is problematic. In fact there is no prius and posterius, no order of importance. There either is or is not a purposeful division of roles and, consequently, division of responsibilities that as a whole creates prerequisites for an efficient parliament.

     Such a division presupposes a certain tension between the two chambers which, however, should be neither excessive nor negligible. Some roles and also some responsibilities must be therefore shared by the two chambers; otherwise there would be only fight and rivalry between them that would inevitably weaken the parliament as a whole in terms of the executive and judicial power. At the same time, it is namely the scope of the tasks of the present government and administration which is so wide that it virtually calls for the division of labour not only in terms of its control but also as concerns passing complex acts through which the governments today exercise to an increasing extent their authority. Sir Henry Maine comments laconically on the relation of the two chambers as follows: "Not a concurring infallibility, but an additional security."

     A bicameral parliament is in my view suitable - I do not say necessary, just suitable, in the complex societies as well as in the societies where democracy has not been deeply rooted, yet. What kind of societies are they? Complex societies are those that are more diverse in terms of nationalities, religion, history, etc., and they need not be only federal states. The determining factor in this respect is the interest in a more varied representation. The societies where democracy is not deeply rooted, yet, are those who have not experienced several substitutions of government by opposition and particularly those where the rule of law is not taken for granted, yet. There the interests are focused on the control and balancing of power.

     However, there exist grounds for bicameralism also in the countries that are relatively homogenous as well as in those countries where democracy in the sense of the rule of people and the rule of law is more or less guaranteed. If we leave aside the ever-present, although sometimes only latent, temptation of power to expand and become stronger, there still exists one more strong reason for the existence of the second chambers, the requirement for the quality of legislation. Another view, the hindsight, the view from another perspective, that is the view of the second chambers that as a rule improves the quality of bills. By this I do not have in mind only the improvement of the content, as such evaluation is always necessarily relative, but also the improvement of the process that will ensure a better reflection of voices of those whom the legislation concerns.

     Where the second chambers are weaker than the first ones, they may at least test the resoluteness and duration of will of the parliamentary majority to pass the respective act. In this respect many countries have at their disposal yet another, the third view - the power of veto of the head of the state and mainly the possibility to cancel acts or their parts by judgements of the Constitutional Court. This complies with the old Czech proverb which I am sure has its analogy also in other languages, namely "measure twice, cut once (look before you leap) "; sometimes it is even said "measure thrice".

     Thus the goal set by the Prague meeting does not consist in defending the existence of particular Senates or bicameralism as such. We go farther and ask when and under what preconditions bicameralism is efficient. As only such bicameralism may be defended.

     In order to make the discussion as concise as possible with regard to the time limits of this meeting we have directly suggested the following hypothesis: bicameralism is efficient when the two chambers are different. It is up to us to either rebut or confirm it. If we confirm it, it would be useful to find out how to ensure such a differentiation conducing to efficiency or what such a differentiation should consist in - competencies, political composition, style of work? Is duplication of the same actions by both chambers purposeful and to what extent, how does their relation change with identical or different political composition, how do they manage to preserve their identity in terms of what interests they represent and how do they represent them face-to-face with the dominance of political parties? Strictly speaking - we should examine the possibilities of ensuring the differentiation between the chambers, as there certainly does not exist only one single way.

     Thus at the beginning of our discussion we ask: is indeed the efficiency of bicameralism conditioned by the difference in the composition of the chambers and what efficiency should it be? Is there a demand for one or for more efficiencies? By this I mean efficiency with regard to different requirements as concerns the quality of legislation, ensuring of the rule of the people and on the enforcement of the rule of law rather than that of people. What is the optimal way how to ensure the respective efficiency, what tools to use, if we perceive them as the instruments of influencing the manners of the establishment of chambers by the constitution and rules in general, may we influence the composition of the chambers and their powers?

     Legitimate defence of the Senate, the second chamber, may be in my view always only the defence of the efficiency of bicameralism, it always must deal with both chambers simultaneously, and particularly with their differentiation and the reasons for such differentiation. Such a defence is not only legitimate but also psychologically more suitable with regard to a certain occasional tension or even rivalry between the two chambers. By this defence we do not intend to glorify the excellence of the second chambers and their alleged merits as compared to the lower or first chamber, what we praise are the merits of bicameralism, or to be more precise the reasons for the existence of a certain system of representation, the system of two rather than one chamber. Such arguments certainly do not create, let alone escalate the natural sound tension between the chambers.

     These are our hypotheses, our rationale that we wish to offer you at the beginning of the fifth meeting of the Association of European Senates. I believe that our debate will either rebut or confirm them, but most probably specify them. And this should be our task to make the questions more precise for the future as there are no definitive answers to them. In this diverse world we may only approximate to the truth by formulating appropriate hypotheses that imply in the sense of the teachings of Karl Popper the possibility to be rebutted, or using his words - falsified. It depends on us, the participants in this meeting, how we shall use the opportunity to confront our views, compare theory and practice of the chambers we head, to learn more about the conditions of meaningfulness and efficiency of a bicameral system.

     This system is characterized inter alia by one remarkable quality. The second chambers in this system vary from each other quite extensively; also this is a certain indicative sign. The variety of the first chambers is not in my view so significant as that of the second chambers. It seems that the second chambers have to adapt much more to the specific conditions of each country in order to constitute together with the first chamber one meaningful useful whole.

     Now, let me make some technical comments. Thanks to you and your staff we have collected filled in questionnaires relating to the topic of our meeting. They will be annexed to the collection of documents that we shall publish. It will include also your contributions, both the main papers and discussion. In the conclusion we shall try in all modesty and with all risks to make some sort of summary. For this reason minutes are taken of the whole proceedings. The collection of documents will be sent to you and it will be available also on the web sites of the Czech Senate.

     Information materials relating to the today´s proceedings have been distributed to you. Additional materials, particularly contributions of the participants, if available, you may find in the lobby in front of the Conference Hall where there is also our staff ready to answer any questions or help. You will find there also telephone, fax and copier. The computer centre is in the President Lounge to the right of the entrance to the Conference Hall. You have four computers with access to internet at your disposal.

     Coffee break will be at 11.00 a.m. in the Jičínský and Frýdlantský lounges. Lunch will be served at 12.30 a.m. in the Senate restaurant, before lunch a group photo will be taken in Salla terena in the garden of the Wallenstein Palace that you saw last night and where we shall go together.

     Speakers will be arranged according to the Czech alphabet, except for those who do not present the main papers. If your are interested in presenting a paper, please fill in the application.

     So much for the schedule of the conference where he have also included the topical discussion on the Intergovernmental Conference that should be as open as possible and therefore not binding.

     In the very conclusion of my speech I would like to mention once more the initiator of our meetings, our colleague Poncelet. It certainly makes sense that it was him who did so as the Senate of the French Republic belongs to what I would call the senate classic. France also gave birth to an ingenious thinker whose ideas have not in the least become obsolete. Although the name of Charles de Montesquieu will not be mentioned in every presentation, references to the theory of the division of power, to "checks and balances", as the Americans and the British would put it, will be undoubtedly one of the main threads of this meeting.

     Our dear friend Poncelet by his idea to examine gradually the present European bicameralism as a practical development of the theory of the division of the power, as its specific application to one of the three powers, i.e. the legislative power, has proved that he honours the tradition of the political thinking of the country of Charles de Montesquieu.

     That is why I would like to ask the President of the Senate of the French Republic Mr. Christian Poncelet as the first to take the floor.

Mr. Christian Poncelet, President of the Senate of the French Republic:

     Mr. President, Dear Colleagues, Dear Friends! Dear Mr. President Pithart, thank you for inviting us to your beautiful capital city to this fifth meeting of the Association of European Senates.

     Prague is one of the few cities that concentrate the European history, civilization and identity of Europe. Here we are in the very heart of our continent, here we feel particularly strongly the significance of our belonging to Europe.

     The topic of our meeting is the difference in the composition of chambers in our bicameral parliaments. This topic is closely connected with the role of the second chamber. And namely from this point of view I shall try to present the French bicameralism.

     In France, the second chamber was established in 1795 as a moderating factor in response to violent acts of the unicameral assembly that imposed terror. The unicameral assembly is an unjust assembly. Since that date bicameralism has been a constant of the French constitutional system, with the exception of a short period of the second republic that came to an inglorious end.

     But what should the composition of the second chamber look like to enable it to play the role of a moderating factor? For a period of 80 years we could not find any clue as to this issue.

     As you may know, the French constitutional system had been for a long period highly unstable, since 1789 we have changed the Constitution fourteen times. These changes have provided us with the opportunity to examine various models for the second chamber and finally, in 1875, the system of indirect election won, the body of electors for the Senate consists of the representatives of local governments. This system has been chosen in order to allow the second chamber to obtain a truly democratic basis and at the same time become the moderating factor ensuing from the indirect election of senators by the representatives of the local governments. If its members get their seats by appointment, it would not have adequate legitimacy as a counterbalance to the first chamber.

     It is noteworthy that the body of electors for the Senate has since 1875 consisted of the representatives of all types of representative offices. As a result today it is composed of the representatives of regions, departments and municipalities.

     Why has this system proved successful? First, because the desired aim has been achieved. The Senate elected on the basis of indirect universal suffrage, certainly does not have the same "demographic" legitimacy as the first chamber, the National Assembly. However, it has a democratic legitimacy which grants it sufficient weight to be able to play its role of a balancing force and a power counterbalance, mentioned by Montesquieu.

     Another reason is that this system coincides with the process of decentralization that has affected the development of the whole republic. In 1875 France was a strongly centralized country. Gradually, the state delegated ever greater powers to the bodies of local government and higher regional administrative units. This process accelerated after the last revision of the Constitution that sanctified the decentralized organization of our republic, i.e. the republic of territorial units.

     Therefore the Senate is a fully qualified parliamentary assembly and executes a double function: first, it contributes to the balance of three powers, but also ensures the representation of the local and territorial government bodies in the parliament. Thus the two chambers of the French Parliament have a different mission as well as the manner of establishment.

     Bicameralism will be able to ensure a balance only if the chambers are different. It is inadmissible to make the Senate a mere copy or replica of the National Assembly.

     Parliamentary chambers in France differ by the term of office: five years in case of deputies, six years in case of senators. Before that the term of office of senators lasted nine years. The Senate has reduced it on its own initiative to six years. On purpose we did not want to have the same term of office as deputies.

     And the electoral system is different, too. Deputies are elected on the basis of the majority system, senators partially by the proportionate and partially by the majority electoral system, it depends on the size of the department where they are elected. In the most densely populated departments they are elected by proportionate electoral system with the man/woman parity, while in the less populated departments the majority system is applied.

     Renewal is not subject to the same rules, either. The National Assembly is renewed as a whole. The Senate is renewed by thirds every three years. The National Assembly may be dissolved, while the Senate cannot. On the other hand, the Senate cannot pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Therefore it is a permanent assembly.

     The number of mandates is also different: the ratio is 577 deputies to 321 senators. The number of senators will gradually increase in the period of 2004 - 2010 to 346 in response to the demographic development of France, as requested by the Constitutional Council.

     What does the composition of the two chambers look like in this context? There is neither a significant difference in the representation of women (12 % in the National Assembly, 11 % in the Senate), nor in the composition by profession (in both chambers 40 % of members come from the state administration).

     The comparison is difficult in terms of the political membership, although we consider only the development since 1958 when the current Constitution came into effect. Political groups have never been absolutely identical in the two chambers. Some general comments may be made on this period:

• the left has gained majority in the National Assembly several times in succession, however, in the Senate it has always been in the minority;
• in the Senate, a significant position has always been taken up by centrist groups (both left and right centre), not so in the National Assembly;
• the ultra-right has never been represented in the Senate;
• the Communist party has always had lower representation in the Senate as compared to the National Assembly.

     Today, i.e. since 2002, the groups of political parties are almost the same in the National Assembly and in the Senate, in both cases it is the UMP group which is the strongest having 365 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly and 165 out of 321 seats in the Senate. The communist group is at present relatively more numerous in the Senate, with 23 seats out of 321, while in the National Assembly it has only 22 out of 577 seats. Several times in the course of the last twenty years the majority in the National Assembly and in the Senate were in direct opposition.

     How has this situation been reflected in the functioning of bicameralism? As soon as the Senate gets in the opposition, its control function is naturally immediately evaluated. However, this function has to manifest itself regardless of the political orientation of the governmental majority. But it has a greater impact when the Senate acts as a critical body that submits counterproposals.

     And what does the legislative function look like? Bicameralism "a la française" is in fact "two-speed". It is an equal bicameralism, which solely the government may make unequal by granting the last word to the National Assembly. But this "last word" depends on the fulfilment of certain conditions.

     First, every governmental bill is submitted either to the National Assembly or to the Senate. Subsequently, it travels between the chambers within their interaction. Various provisions are exposed to such a pendulum. The provisions that are in the course of the process of re-consideration adopted by both chambers are withdrawn from the discussion and the agenda includes only those issues about which the chambers have not agreed. A mixed parity commission is convened to examine them. And only when this commission fails to achieve an amicable solution, the National Assembly may have the last word. If entitled by the government to outvote the Senate, the National Assembly has to go back to the latest bill it has adopted, with amendments made by the Senate, as the case may be.

     Thus the legislative process is by all means conceived in such a way to support the adoption of the Senate's amendments by the National Assembly. As a result the Senate retains the legislative influence although each chamber has a different politically oriented majority. In this case the National Assembly adopts about one half of the proposed amendments of the Senate.

     When the majorities are of the same political orientation, this percentage is much higher, exceeding on average 80 %, a record score of 92 % was achieved during the last session in June.

     In this respect it should be noted that the "last word" of the National Assembly is far from being a rule, regardless of the majorities. Since 1958 outvoting has been used only in one out of eight acts, i.e. in 13 % of the bills. A great majority of acts (87 %) has been adopted by both chambers.

     I will draw three conclusions from the presentation of the French system:

• first, the aim of our system is a clear differentiation of the two chambers, which is necessary in order to enable the second chamber to play its role of a moderating factor, a mediator;
• secondly, our system significantly supports cooperation between the chambers in the legislative process. Bicameralism is a guarantee of two different views of laws as was a little while ago pointed out by Mr. President Pithart. The law is too important to be left up to the decision of only one representative body. The best acts have been adopted jointly by both chambers;
• and finally: by representing local government bodies, the Senate complements the National Assembly. The National Assembly represents the population and the Senate territorial units, however, territorial units with their population.

     Thus I would summarize bicameralism "a la française" in three words: difference, cooperation and complementariness.

     Thank you, dear friends, for your attention.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you dear friend Poncelet. The French experience is highly relevant. France is indeed the country of the senate classic. We all shall remember your words that the Senate has come into being as a defence against terror as well as that the Senate is a sort of moderator. The search for an optimal position of bicameralism in your country took a long time and therefore it is most relevant. In any case it is evident that it does not lead to simplicity because neither the society nor life is simple. Thank you, our founder Poncelet.

     Now I would like to ask the President of the Senate of the Kingdom of Belgium Mr. Armand De Decker to take the floor.

Mr. Armand De Decker, President of the Senate of the Kingdom of Belgium:

     Mr. President, Dear Friend Petr Pithart! First I should like to thank you for receiving us in Prague, in this beautiful city; in the Wallenstein Palace which indeed concentrates the history of our Continent. I am very glad that the Senate of the Czech Republic has convened us here today to discuss a very important issue, namely whether a different composition of the chambers in the bicameral parliaments is a precondition of their efficiency.

     The recipe for an ideal bicameralism has been haunting political scientists and lawyers for quite a long time. Therefore there exist a number of analyses from which we may draw the common denominator that is usually recognized.

     In the bicameral parliamentary system the second chamber is necessarily different as without such a differentiation it would be a mere duplication of the first chamber which would weaken its justification. Such a system would be rather cumbersome: an equal bicameralism of identically composed chambers would not make much of a contribution. If the party discipline were the same, the governments would not allow either chamber to change the principles governing the bills. And finally - the main reservation - the two chambers would not be able to divide the labour between them.

     However, if the two chambers may independently develop their culture, then why should be the equal bicameralism inefficient, why should it not be justified? When stating this, we would have to say at the same time that unequal bicameralism will not face such difficulties in asserting itself. Mr. President, you were right when you said in the introduction that the systems of the second chambers differ in each of our countries, and this is a typical feature of the second chambers as compared to the first ones. The second chambers are also often exposed to criticism: the criticism by governments, criticism by the first chambers, as by their nature they play a role of the constitutional institutional counterbalance, as mentioned by Mr. Poncelet.

     Therefore it is important to take into consideration this specific role of the second chambers if we want to preserve their meaning. The specificity of the second chamber may be introduced in terms of its composition as well as its powers. In 1831, when the Belgian parliamentary system was established, the legislator chose unequal bicameralism in terms of composition. The Senate of 1831 followed the pattern of the Napoleon's Conservative Senate and was filled by the representatives of aristocracy and wealthy citizens. It was supposed to be the counterbalance to the highly progressive even revolutionary trends represented in the Chamber of Deputies, although rumour had it that it was rather a demagogy that prevailed there. A similar specificity is in contradiction with our modern vision of democracy. No wonder then, when we have found out that the Belgian Senate has lost in the course of individual constitutional reforms this specificity and this feature.

     During 20th century the Belgian bicameralism had become equal both in terms of the composition and the competence of the chambers: Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have the same composition. It means that both the deputies and senators are elected on the basis of the same criteria and both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate exercise the same powers.

     However, the nature resents emptiness and at the same time it does not like duplication of functions, and constitutional debates do not escape from these principles, either. In the course of the last thirty years, Belgium has gradually become a federal state. And this may be the reason why in 1993 the legislator re-introduced unequal bicameralism and specificity both as concerns powers and composition.

     Forty out of 71 senators are elected directly and express the necessity to give the Senate democratic legitimacy that would be indisputable. Although, after the reform of 1993 the Senate no longer has the possibility to overthrow the government as was the case of III. Republic in France, nor has the budgetary function which is assigned to the Chamber of Deputies, but it retains its legislative role which is of key importance.

     Twenty-one senators are designated by the representative bodies of individual national communities in Belgium. These senators are elected during regional elections and meet in sessions according to their affiliation to either the Flemish, Walloon or French community. As a result these 21 senators ensure the representation of the states that constitute the federation.

     And finally, 10 senators are not elected, they are co-opted by their colleagues. By co-optation the legislator chose to give preference to the factor of experience in the composition of the Senate and thus to turn it into a chamber based on reflection and a more profound consideration, i.e. into a chamber ensuring the quality of legislation.

     Since the reform of 1993, the Senate has been characterized by a hybrid composition reflecting these new competencies. And this is the basic rule for any legislative body. It is not coherent to separate the powers from the composition and the two components must be in harmony. The Belgian experience has taught us that the actual challenge is the search for such a model that would introduce the theory into practice. The work of only 21 senators of individual communities who in fact exercise a double mandate would impair the proper functioning of the Senate.

     However, how may we assume that the units constituting the federation participate in the federal legislation through the Senate and that the Senate reflects the structure of the country and is the meeting point of the regions and the state, when only 21 out of 71 senators would represent the units constituting the federation? And at the same time how can the Senate fulfil the second function, i.e. to be a legislative chamber and the chamber of reflection, when 21 out of 71 senators have a double mandate and, consequently, also a different time schedule of their work than the others?

     Dear colleagues, you may have already noticed that ambitious constitutional visions clash with reality. And in such a case it is necessary to seek a compromise between theory and practice, i.e. to change the composition of the Senate in order to improve the fulfilment of the respective tasks. As concerns the representation of the units constituting the federation, several models are being examined in Belgium. It would be possible to increase the number of senators who represent individual communities which is most probably the way we shall choose or it is in fact possible to break the link between the senators from the units constituting the federation and these units and appoint their substitutes.

     We have also noticed that the function of a co-opted senator should have a new content as it is very useful, at least in my view. To appoint to the Senate the representatives of civic society according to their professional and other experience, according to the value which they may add to the debate of the chamber that is supposed to inject the element of reflection into legislation. However, instead, the co-opted senator is often a person which was not elected in the preceding elections, or as the case may be, was for various reasons of the party balance on the list of candidates on the unelectable place. As a result, various ways are examined also in case of the co-opted senators. Although the Constitution preserves certain possibilities for direct election, the co-opted senators could within the first hypothesis represent some fields of activities - the university sphere, science and research, or within another possible solution the senators who are co-opted would not be candidates in the two preceding parliamentary elections which would provide them with a specific profile that would distinguish them from the senators who were elected directly either to the Senate or on the regional level.

     Mr. President, dear colleagues, I am not convinced that a different composition of the two chambers in bicameral parliaments is a precondition for their efficiency but it may facilitate their life. A different composition is not in my view an absolute necessity. On the other hand, I am deeply convinced that the efficiency of any parliamentary institution, be it a one-chamber or bicameral parliament, depends ultimately on the correlation between their powers and their composition. Thank you.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you, Mr. President of the Senate of the Kingdom of Belgium. We appreciate that as early as in the second presentation we heard a polemic voice. But as we have said, we present a hypothesis in order to either confirm or rebut it.

     The history of Belgium is quite different from that of France, today it is characterized by a federal structure, and in spite of it has undergone a similarly difficult search, and as Mr. President told us this search has not been finished, yet. We have listened very attentively to the deliberations on different concepts of co-opted senators. It is a topic that is connected namely with the concept of the Senate as the chamber of reflection, experience and a certain potential distance from everyday politics. And in the conclusion I would like to say that I have found most interesting what you said at the very beginning that the two chambers should develop their own cultures, their own political cultures, their own style of debate, arguing, decision making.

     In any case your speech, Mr. President, was highly stimulating.

     And now I would like to ask the President of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Mustafa Pamuk who is for the first time the guest of our Association, to take the floor. All the more I welcome you Mr. President.

Mr. Mustafa Pamuk, President of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     Dear Colleagues, I would like to greet you on behalf of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially President of the Senate of the Czech Republic.

     I must say that I appreciate that I may be here with you. I represent Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country that has recently faced serious problems. As you all may know we now try to build a democratic state which as I believe will shortly joint the European integration groupings and will become a part of the European family. We believe in Europe and we believe also in the European democracy. Therefore we carefully listened to the experience of parliamentary democracies dealt with by the colleagues before me.

     I would like to present to you the current system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

     Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic state following the Constitution and laws. Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic, and at the same time it has three what we call constitutive nations: they are the Bosnians, Croats and Serbians. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there live also many ethnic minorities that enjoy all rights pursuant to the European and world standards. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina granted by its Constitution the rights to all people from ethnic minorities.

     According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina the supreme legislative body is the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has two chambers, namely the House of Peoples and the Chamber of Deputies. The House of Peoples or the Senate has 15 members that are elected from among all three constitutive nations. Five members of the Senate are elected from the entity called the Serbian Republic, ten members are elected from the entity called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina - five Bosnians and five Croats. All members of the Senate are equal; all decisions are adopted by the two chambers on an equal footing.

     As compared to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate has two specific features that are regulated by the Constitution and the Rules of Order, namely it is entitled to be dissolved and also it makes decisions relating to the issues of vital importance to the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

     What does it imply? As you may know, there was a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina that could be called the conflict between nations as it involved violation of some national interests. And therefore it is the task of the Senate to protect national interests and balance them and ensure such conditions that will allow resolving all issues. It means that Bosnia and Herzegovina is at the moment one of the exceptional states in Europe that could not function properly without the Senate. We believe that the Senate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, naturally with the support of the European senates and also some support of the European Union, will qualitatively develop its work in our conditions.

     Therefore the purpose of my speech was to tell you what we in Bosnia and Herzegovina are doing now and that we shall always attend all meetings of this Association in order to gain more experience and overcome obstacles we shall encounter in the European integration.

     Once more I should like to thank you. I am very pleased that I may be here with you.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you, Mr. President. I think it was for most of us for the first time that we have heard about the structure of your parliamentary system, about which specialized studies will be written in future and your country will be included in all sorts of comparisons. At first glance it seems that the reason for the existence of your Senate in your country is namely the fact that you are a typically complex society. Obviously this is also why your Senate is called the House of Peoples. We are glad that you have come and that you are interested in the active membership of our Association.

     Let me pass the chairing of the meeting to my colleague Vice-President Jan Ruml, so that I can deliver the speech on behalf of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.

Mr. Jan Ruml, Vice-President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Ladies and Gentlemen, now we shall hear the contribution of President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Petr Pithart.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     In our modern history the bicameral parliament worked de facto in the periods between 1920 - 1939, 1969 - 1992 and from 1996 onwards. The first two were Czechoslovak parliaments, in the third case has been the Czech Parliament.

     In between the wars the Senate was criticised on the grounds that its composition and mode of functioning made it a mere and less visible reflection of the Chamber of Deputies. And it was a rightful criticism. In reality, political decisions were made by the leadership of political parties of the ruling coalition outside of parliament.

     Likewise, both chambers of the Federal Assembly between 1969 - 1992 were similar as to their composition and symmetrical as to their respective powers. Usually, they worked in joint sessions; this kind of bicameralism is branded as fictional.

     In 1992, because of bad experience with the identity of parliamentary chambers, the authors of the constitution paid considerable attention to the differentiation of the chambers of the new parliament. They arrived at the conclusion that only chambers that will be set up differently could differ from each other in their composition and activity and that only such chambers will resist the control by a single political will. Only then can tension arise between the chambers, leading both to the supervision over the quality of legislation and to a system of checks and balances.

     The differentiation between the chambers was to be achieved by differences in the respective election systems, by conditions as to the right to be elected, the length of term, through the method of renewing the Senate and through its undissolvability. In practice, this was enhanced by different election terms (June for the Chamber of Deputies, October till November for the Senate). On the other hand, no wide-ranging discussion was held about the differentiation of those whom the chamber will represent. In the unitary state, the Senate as a representative of regions was refused, because among other reasons, the federal state was breaking up at that time; there was a wide-spread concern about similar processes within the Czech Republic.

     Both chambers of the Parliament of the Czech Republic are elected by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage. Every Czech citizen who has attained the age of eighteen has the right to vote. Every citizen who has attained the age of twenty-one may be elected a deputy and every citizen who has attained the age of forty may be elected to the Senate.

     The Chamber of Deputies is elected on the basis of proportional representation which, in concrete terms, means the election of two hundred deputies in fourteen regions on the basis of D´Hondt method of allocating votes to mandates. Eighty-one senators are elected in single seat constituencies in an absolute majority system. In order to win in the first round the candidate must get more than fifty per cent of the total ballot. If there is no such candidate, a second round takes place with the top two candidates; the winner is one who gets more votes. Every constituency has on average 120 thousand inhabitants.

     All Czech parliamentarians are elected. Only in 1920 was there a discussion about forming one part of the second chamber differently, by appointment for instance. Over the last few years, we hear from time to time that the regional presidents (the highest representatives of the local government in the fourteen regions, the "hejtmans") could become senators ex officio.

     Aside from the differentiation of conditions for the right to be elected, the number of members and the election system, there is now also a differentiation as to the length of the term. The Chamber of Deputies is elected for four years, it is renewed as a whole and can be dissolved under some specific circumstances. The Senators have a six years term, one third of the Senate is renewed every two years and the second chamber is undissolvable.

     A great many attributes of the Czech Senate have been taken over from the USA or from France. To justify them, we could take for instance the Federalist Papers, namely those by James Madison: the higher age of senators was justified by a greater scope of necessary knowledge and skills. The length of the mandate is both a precondition of a higher independence vis-a-vis the volatile moods of the electorate and a possibility to accumulate experience acquired in the parliament. If senators are not to become victims of the tyranny of passion as the deputies are, they must represent a less numerous body. This will enable the development of the sense of personal responsibility in each of them and, at the same time, it will make it possible for the electorate to better exercise supervision. Partial renewal of the Senate contributes to the continuity of the legislature: single elections will not bring about a radical shift in the legislative process. Moreover, an unstable government erodes the confidence and decreases the prestige of the country abroad.

     However, till now, I have spoken only about the different features promoting differentiation and not about the reality of the past almost seven years. Since I have spent all these years in the Senate, I can say on the basis of my own personal experience that the Senate is different from the Chamber of Deputies. But at the same time I think that it is evolving: periods of stronger influence by political parties are alternating with periods of stronger identification of senators with their chamber - a bond which can be stronger than a party affiliation. A more firm pressure by political parties can be noticed usually when the parties grasp the real significance of the second chamber. When it is no longer a matter of "only" some amendments to ordinary bills but also a matter of deciding on amendments to the Constitution or on far-reaching reforms, political parties start to influence their senators much more intensively than before. But they are limited for instance by the rather long and, thanks to the undissolvability of the Senate, secure mandate of the senator.

     While now it is the representatives of political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies who dominate amongst the senators, there are also representatives of small regional parties or independent senators. In the Chamber of Deputies, those deputies who are not members of a political group are a total exception - there are usually no more than two - that is one per cent, senators not affiliated to any party faction are quite a common phenomenon in the Senate - at present they are eight, i.e. ten per cent. Throughout the years we have been able to find quite a number of political groups - both in the Chamber and in the Senate - which had no counterpart in the other chamber, for instance in 2002 the political group of the independents was set up in the Senate but is not present in the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, often the ratio of the individual political parties´ groups differs as well: typically, the governing social democratic party has seventy deputies, which is thirty-five per cent of the total number of deputies, but only ten senators, that is some twelve per cent of all the members of the upper house! As to the representation of the right and the left, the Senate has constantly been right-of-centre and the representation of left-wing political entities has been weakening.

     I would say, not only because of the structure of the political factions in the Senate but also because of a weaker party discipline, that the situation in the Senate is less clear-cut. Therefore, when it comes to the vote, it is usually not enough to simply count all those present but it is also necessary to convince them by rational arguments. And it is this, amongst other things, that I consider to be the contribution of the second chamber to the process of cultivating the political and parliamentary culture, a contribution which can hardly be provided by chambers deciding about the very existence of government.

     A different composition of the Senate and in many instances even differences between the political type of a senator and the political type of a deputy make it possible, for the Senate, to fulfil the function of reviewing bills passed by the Chamber of Deputies and the function of checks and balances. I venture to say that it is the prerequisite of the willingness to enter into conflicts which in my opinion is more important than the final result. If at the end the Chamber of Deputies outvotes the Senate, it is on the Chamber's own responsibility; it had an opportunity to reassess its decision. The Senate cannot be defeated on fundamental issues. For instance out of fourteen constitutional bills, only nine were approved by the Senate.

     If I were now to answer in one sentence the question raised at this meeting I cannot but say the following:

     From the point of view of our Czech experience of almost seven years, the different composition of the chambers really proves necessary for an effective bicameralism. It is certainly not an issue of differentiation at any cost but of a differentiation that is beneficial to the quality of legislation, prevents sharp and often ill-considered changes and an excessive influence of leading bodies of political parties, because all this usually decreases the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy.

     Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Jan Ruml, Vice-President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you Mr. President. As the last before the coffee break we shall hear the Vice-President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Italy Mr. Lamberto Dini. Please take the floor.

Mr. Lamberto Dini, Vice-President of the Senate of the Republic of Italy:

     Let me thank you for your hospitality and for the warm welcome in the seat of the Senate in the beautiful capital city of the Czech Republic.

     Underlying the evocative title of this meeting of ours is an issue that is fundamental to all bicameral systems, namely the relationship between the functions of the two chambers and their composition. Bicameralism stems from the need to represent heterogeneous social groups. This is the reason that led England to have its Assembly meet in two chambers - the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

     In our era, the principal reason for the division of parliaments into two chambers lies in the need to represent, on the one hand, the body of citizens as a whole and, on the other, the individual member states of a federal state or the territorial subdivisions of a unitary state.

     Also the experience of the Republic of Italy paradoxically confirms the close links between functions and composition of the two Houses - two Houses that today have the same functions and are thus composed in a similar way with a politically homogeneous result.

     As Italy emerged from the fascist regime, the decision of the Constituent Assembly was to make the focus of the institutional system a strong Parliament, comprising two Chambers to which the same functions were assigned: the same lawmaking powers, the same function of in terms of the confidence of the Government. Nevertheless, during the debate in the Constituent Assembly the discussion focused strongly on the advisability of making a clear distinction between the compositions of the two Chambers. The most widely debated proposal was that of making the Senate a professional chamber. This and other proposals were, however, rejected.

     Today, therefore, only a few features distinguish the two Chambers. In the first place, while the Chamber of Deputies is exclusively elective, the Senate also comprises five life senators nominated by the President of the Republic "from among those who have honoured their country through their exceptional merits in the social, scientific, artistic and literary fields"; also the former Presidents of the Republic are life members of the Senate. The requirements for voters and candidates are also different: for the Senate only those over the age of twenty-five are entitled to vote while it is necessary to be over the age of forty in order to stand for election; all citizens of legal age can vote for the Chamber of Deputies while candidates for election must be over the age of twenty-five. Further, the number of senators elected is only half of that of the deputies. The electoral laws are different, although so far they have produced politically homogeneous results.

     In the original text passed by the Constituent Assembly, also the term of office of the Senate was different, six years, while that of the Chamber is five. A motion approved by the Constituent Assembly envisaged radically different electoral systems: in the original idea, the Senate was to be elected by a single-member majority or "first past the post" system, while the Chamber of Deputies was elected by the proportional system.

     In practice, both these differences (term of office and electoral system) have disappeared. The term of office of the two Chambers was formally equalized in 1963, thus codifying a practice in which the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was accompanied by an early dissolution of the Senate. Although based on a single-member constituency, until 1993, the electoral system functioned in a wholly proportional way. Since 1993, both the Chamber and the Senate have a substantially homogeneous mixed electoral system (a majority system for the election of three quarters of the members and a proportional system for the remainder).

     These two differences, therefore, which might have led to a clear diversity in the political composition of the two Chambers, were eliminated precisely on the basis of the consideration of the perfect equality of the functions of the two Chambers. We have two Chambers that both have to accord the Government their confidence and must therefore have the same political composition in order to avoid paralysing the system. The Italian experience thus provides further evidence of the extraordinary link, correlation between the structure of the two Chambers and their function.

     For many years in Italy the debate on the bicameral system was focused essentially on the efficiency of the bicameral structure, in other words, how to avoid the subdivision into two Chambers, both with the same powers, acting as a hindrance to the decision-making processes.

     In this connection it should be noted that as far as the legislative procedure is concerned, despite the perfect equality in the attribution of the two Chambers, which could lead to a delayed approval of bills, there is also a characteristic specific feature in the Italian system: the possibility of entrusting to parliamentary Committees, operating "in a legislative capacity", the task of approving bills.

     The recent constitutional revision tending towards a pronounced devolution of functions of the State to the Regions (constitutional Act no. 3/2001) has sparked a debate in Italy on the advisability of introducing a differentiation of functions in the two Chambers. This differentiation would inevitably lead to a distinction in the criteria followed in forming the two Houses.

     The initial response to this need is contained in the concluding article of the Act of Constitutional Revision I have cited. It actually makes provision for the inclusion of "representatives of the Regions, the Autonomous Provinces and the local authorities" in the joint bicameral parliamentary committee for regional matters. This provision, which would introduce a mixed body into the heart of our bicameral system, in which members of the two Chambers would sit side by side with the representatives of the regions and the other local authorities, has not been implemented, yet.

     In the last few days the government has announced the presentation of a new constitutional revision initiative. In all likelihood, therefore, the issue of the differentiation of the functions of the two Chambers will again be brought to the focus of the Italian political attention. The objective, which is approved by many, is to implement what the members of the Constituent Assembly had already foreseen. Paragraph 1 of Article 57 of the Italian Constitution states that the Senate of the Republic "is elected on a regional basis". In accordance with this principle, paragraph 2 of Article 57 states that no region, with two exceptions, can have a number of senators less than seven. Already today this guarantees that even the smaller regions have a representative weight that does not correspond only to the number of inhabitants in the given constituency. However, in practice, this element has so far failed to make the Senate a body that is truly representative of the local territorial situation. By the introduction of this system the Senate will become a true representative of the reality of individual territorial units.

     I have listened and will continue to listen very carefully to the contributions presented at our meeting by several colleagues, which could provide valuable ideas for the debate that is beginning in Italy.

     Indeed I believe that the tasks of this Association of ours should include that of suggesting common indications, based on the different experience that point in the direction of the construction of a more cohesive Europe that is nevertheless able to appreciate the benefits of autonomy as well as the activity of self-governing territorial units.

     Thank you Mr. President.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     I thank our colleague Mr Dini. Vice-president of the Senate of the Republic of Italy has documented that the debate about the difference in chambers does not necessarily be only academic. In Italy it is obviously a question that stirs up the political system. We do not forget that Italy is the country on the territory of which this institution has come into being and was given its name.

     I think that it has been proved that we have chosen a good question of our meeting and that we have rightly put the question mark at its end. We did not mean by it a rhetorical question. Indeed, it is being confirmed that each country accentuates different issues relating to the potential differentiation of the two chambers. And so it was another most inspiring speech, colleague Dini. Thank you.

     Now we shall have a break for coffee which will be served in the Frýdlantský and Jičínský lounges. We shall reconvene here at 11.20 a.m. Thank you.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Dear Colleagues, please take your seats, we shall continue. I would like now to ask the Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Czech Republic Ms. Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher, to take the floor. She will herself explain why the representative of the Senate of the Netherlands could not attend this meeting. Please.

Ms. Ida Leonore van Veldhuizen-Rothenbücher, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Czech Republic:

     Dear Mr. Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, dear presidents of European senates, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen! On behalf of the President of the First Chamber of the States General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands let me thank you President Pithart that you have agreed to host and organize 5th Meeting of the Association of European Senates here in Prague in the Czech Republic.

     Unfortunately Ms. President of our Senate could not come due to the sudden death of three members of the Senate in the Hague. Therefore she has asked me to convey her sincere greetings and wishes for successful discussions, and tell you that she is looking forward to seeing you at the next meeting or even before. Thank you.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you, Your Excellency. The apology is sad and more than justified. We look forward to meeting next time. Now Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland Mr. Longin Hieronim Pastusiak will take the floor.

Mr. Longin Hieronim Pastusiak, President of the Senate of the Republic of Poland:

     Mr. President, Distinguished Colleagues! Let me join the previous speakers who have expressed their thanks to our host, President Pithart for inviting us here and providing such marvellous conditions for our meeting.

     The issue of the cooperation of the two chambers of the parliament is of vital importance for the future of Senates as such. Let me at the beginning point out several fundamental theses.

     The more differences between the two chambers the better and higher the legitimacy of the second chamber. The differences may be of course numerous and some of the have been already mentioned here. There may be a number of differences in the competencies, responsibilities, composition, the system of elections; there may exist different criteria for the choice of the respective differences. However, we may also find a number of other different parameters.

     I represent a country with a very long parliamentary tradition, dating back to 15th century. The first Polish Senate was created in 1493. When talking to my American colleagues I always say that one year after Christopher Columbus discovered America, we had a Senate in Poland.

     The history of the Polish parliamentarism may be an interesting study for all of us. Since the very beginning, the Polish parliament has been composed of two chambers. The Senate, as all the Senates at that time, was of course not elected democratically and represented the aristocracy and high rank clergy. Its members were nominated by the king on a life-long basis. At the end of 18th century the Senate already became a vital tool in the creation of law in Poland. Unfortunately with the loss of our independence in 1795 the Senate was dissolved. After regaining independence at the end of World War I, the Polish Senate was reborn in its modern form. From then on the elections were already held on a democratic basis and we can say that the Senate truly represented the whole society.

     Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1935 changed the system of elections to the Senate: one third of the Senate was appointed by the President of the Republic and two thirds of the members were elected by a selected group of electors, special electoral boards).

     The Polish Senate of today dates back to 1989 when it was restored on the basis of the Round Table negotiations between Solidarity and the Communist Party. The free elections to the Senate in June 4, 1989 showed the power of the opposition which won 99 of 100 seats and marked the end of the Communist period in the history of Poland. The Senate became a vital actor of the changes that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, passing bills necessary to transform both the political and economic systems.

     According to the Polish constitutions of 1997, there are little differences between the two chambers of the Parliament. Both chambers are elected on the same day, both have the same term of office. Nevertheless, the electoral system varies - Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) is elected on the proportional basis, people vote for the party list, while the Senate is elected by the majority election system on the basis of different constituencies.

     Poland is a unitary, not a federal state. Article 104 of the current Polish Constitution clearly states that members of parliament "shall be representatives of the Nation. They shall not be bound by any instructions of the electorate ".

     We are aware that the current system is not ideal and we have launched a political debate about possible changes. There have been voices about elimination of the Senate as a whole, but now these voices are heard only rarely.

     In the current stage of the discussion, we are thinking about changing the electoral system, so that the Senators, unlike the lower house, are elected in single mandate electoral districts. This will help in binding the Senators more closely with their local communities and help in transforming the Senate into a chamber representing the Polish regions more profoundly. Thus, 383 thousand inhabitants would be the size of such electoral districts represented by one senator. This proposal - which in fact is a sort of structural change from multi-mandate to single mandate districts - has been already prepared and soon it will be submitted for discussion in the Senate.

     We are also discussing the possibility of changing the Senate into a chamber that will monitor the European Union legislation according to the Protocol of the control of principles of subsidiarity and proportionality of the Constitution of the European Union. The Senate has played a very active role in the harmonisation of the Polish law and norms with the legislation of the European Union, the so called acquis communaitaires. We have amended a whole number of bills submitted by the lower chamber in order to facilitate this harmonisation with the Community law.

     Nevertheless, it is clear that the discussions about the changing role of the Senate in Poland will continue.

     In the conclusion it may be summarized that Poland has gone a long way from a Senate representing the upper classes of the society to a Senate representing the whole society.

     Ladies and Gentlemen, after more than five centuries of the existence of the Polish Senate we are still experimenting with new ideas as to its role in the Polish political system in order to make it more efficient and more responsive to the expectations of the Polish society.

     And now let me, Mr. President, mention another two issues not necessarily related to the topic we are discussing.

     First, as you may know Poland has been entrusted with the organization of 6th meeting of our Association. And it is a pleasure for us to invite you to Warsaw in May 24 - 25, 2004 - (Monday and Tuesday). The proposed topic is "The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union".

     As a matter of fact, May 2004 will also be the first month of the membership of new states of the European Union and the number of the Union members will thus increase to 25. For us, the new members, it will be naturally very interesting to hear the opinions of those, so to say, old members of the European Union on how in fact the national parliaments function within the EU, what should be and what are the relations between the national parliaments and the European Parliament. I think this could be a very interesting topic in May next year when we shall meet already as the EU members. I would like to hear you opinion in this respect.

     And then I have yet another issue. We all have got the document "Statutes of the Association of European Senates". In my view it is already rather out of date and needs certain updating. I think we should amend this document as for instance it still includes the Croatian Chamber of Districts which is no longer the member of the Association as it ceased to exist. On the other hand, we have here the delegation of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, i.e. the second chamber, which is member of the Association and is not listed in the document.

     I would also like to know what the situation of the Irish and the British looks like, why they are not members of our Association. Maybe we should take some steps to enlarge our Association, to make it more universal.

     So much for my part. Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you, Mr. Marshal. I think we all shall remember the date 1493, not only because it is one year after Columbus discovered America, but also because it is the beginning of a remarkably long history of the Polish Senate.

     Neither could we miss, dear Longin, your clear message relating to the connection between the Polish independence and the Polish freedom and the existence of the Senate. The end of independence and extinguishment of freedom entails also the end of the Senate. I want to believe that his connection is significant not only for you but for all of us.

     I asked Mr. Marshal, to give us his idea about the topic of our next meeting already now so that we have time enough during the day to comment on it and at the end of the meeting of our Association to confirm or specify the offer of our future host.

     Thank you, Mr. Marshal. And now I will ask the President of the Federal Council of the Republic of Austria Mr. Hans Ager to take the floor.

Mr. Hans Ager, President of the Federal Council of the Republic of Austria:

     Thank you, dear Mr. President. Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues, Dear Friends.

     First, I wish to thank sincerely Mr. President of the Czech Senate Dr. Petr Pithart for the hospitality and magnificent organization of this meeting.

     Our hosts have included in the beautiful new book on the Czech Senate also the chapter dealing with bicameralism in the Czech history. And this chapter begins with the year 1848 and the then constitutional debate in the Austrian Imperial Diet that started first in Vienna and then moved to Kroměříž (Kremsier).

     In the course of this debate it became apparent that the bicameral system was considered by the members of the then members of the Austrian Parliament as part of the constitutional framework. Nobody doubted the necessity of the establishment of the second chamber, the discussion concerned only the organizational form and function. That was the subject of the debate.

     Seventy years later after the foundation of the Republic of Austria as well as of the Czechoslovak Republic the situation was different. In both countries in the constitutional discussion certain political forces, social democracy in particular, set the requirement for the establishment of a one-chamber system, in spite of it the system of two chambers had been enforced in both countries and today it belongs to the constitutional fundamentals both in the Republic of Austria and in the Czech Republic.

     As of today, bicameral parliaments have been established in 19 out of 47 democratically structured European states and the investigation of 1997 showed that bicameral parliaments were in 66 out of 193 states of the world. Thus the bicameral principle continues to be an inherent quality of both political theory and political practice.

     However, what may be the significance of the second chamber in modern democracy, what is its function? Answers to these questions follow two directions. First, - and this is in fact the only justified argument for the existence of two politically identically structured chambers - so first, it is the improvement of the quality of the product of the parliamentary process, i.e. legislation. On the other hand, emphasis is put in this respect on the function of representation of certain interests. The latter function is older.

     While the idea to attribute the central role in the system of "checks and balances" to the second chamber presupposes that this second chamber will assume mainly in the legislative process the same or at least approximately the same position in terms of the procedure as the first chamber, this does not necessarily apply to the perception of the second function which I have mentioned, that is the function of the improvement of the quality of the legislative process: from a separate discussion of the respective matter in two chambers - independently of their political composition - this argumentation pattern expects a more profound settlement of the respective matter, from the involvement of the second chamber as a "control chamber" in the legislative process the chance to correct the hastily adopted or ill-considered resolutions before they take the legal effect.

     And yet another function is attributed to the second chamber as "the chamber of reflections", namely the function of reflecting those essential issues that the first chamber overloaded by everyday political administrative work cannot deal with, thus guaranteeing a long-term quality of the political process.

     Therefore in order to perform this function of ensuring the quality it is enough to equip the second chamber, unlike the first chamber, with other competencies in the legislative process, as a rule with the suspensory veto. The comparison of competencies of the two chambers - or their exercising - thus shows what function is allocated to the second chamber in the constitutional order, or what function it exercises in the constitutional reality.

     Ideally, the two chambers may be equal or the second chamber may be equipped with lesser powers as compared to the first chamber. However, in many political systems it is possible to trace also an intermediate stage, and namely that even with entirely or approximately the same constitutional legal position of the two chambers, the second chamber leaves the prerogative of law making to the first chamber and uses its competence only moderately, be it either due to the deficit of legitimacy perceived by its members or in 20th century increasingly due to the party-state conditions. Shifting of the central function towards ensuring of the quality of legislation in 20th century resulted also in a constitutionally political tendency towards lesser powers of the second chamber as compared to the first one.

     Of the general vision that the function of the second chamber consists in ensuring the freedom through the division of legislative power, in 20th century only one argumentation line and, consequently, one type of the second chamber has asserted itself both in theoretical discussion and practical politics - namely the idea and type of a regional chamber that is competent in the federal state to defend regional freedom of individual federal states with regard to the abstract all-state majority. As a result, also in the countries that do not have officially a federal structure, such as Spain, the second chamber has a significant function of representing regions.

     Also the Austrian Federal Council, which I have the honour to represent, is as the chamber of states competent to reflect the interests of the federal states in the process of the federal legislation. In a modern plurality state the interests of federal states and the all-state interests naturally overlap and the political parties operating both in the regional units and on the nationwide level have the intermediary function.

     A specific dynamics characteristic of the development of a modern society of course also implies that the mechanisms of creation of the will of the state conceived under different social framework conditions must be continuously reviewed in terms of whether they correspond to the spirit of the time or whether they have to be adjusted to the changed framework conditions. In this respect, a bold project of the preparation of the revision of constitution has been recently launched in Austria. A convention composed of representatives of the federal level, federal states, municipalities and various social groups called in short "The Austrian Convention" has convened in order to draw up proposals of the state and constitutional reform. The discussion should include also the tasks and goals of the state as well as the state institutions and their structures, division of tasks among regional units and the rules of democratic supervision.

     The parliamentary bicameral system in Austria thus faces a new step in its development. Parliaments in general, and the second chambers in particular, must similarly as all state institutions re-consider their function in the modern society and adapt to the needs of citizens from whom their legitimacy derives.

     If within this framework the second chambers, including the Austrian Federal Council, feel particularly competent to defend the regional aspects in both the national and European politics, I perceive it as a relevant expression of the increasing awareness of the significance of regional identities which is conveyed also in the formulation "Europe of Regions" as an expression of politics that is close to citizens and that must be for us, the members of parliaments, the central mission.

     Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Petr Pithart, President of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic:

     Thank you for your well conceived contribution with theoretical and historical aspects of the development of Europe. I hope I am not mistaken if in this respect I mention the tradition of the Austrian deliberations on bicameralism. One of your predecessors, Professor Herbert Schambeck, was President of the second chamber and at the same time one of the most prominent European theoreticians of bicameralism. Meeting with him at the time when our Senate was coming into being, was most inspiring to us. Please give our best regards to Professor Schambeck.

     I thank you very much also for mentioning the episode of the Upper House that the Austrian, Czechs, Moravians and Silesians shared in the last but one century.

     Now I would like to ask Janez Sušnik, President of the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia to take the floor.

Janez Sušnik, President of the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia:

     We would like to thank Mr. President for inviting us to 5th Meeting of the Association of European Senates. Let me thank you, Mr. President for the excellent organisation of this conference as well as for the hospitality that is being extended to us. We also appreciate that our 5th Meeting takes place on the premises that are filled with history and beauty.

     Our chamber has a very short tradition. It was founded on the basis of the Constitution of 1991 after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The National Council of the Republic of Slovenia is a representative body that as stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, represents social, economic, professional and local interests. Its two fundamental constituent parts are the representatives of working and social interests ("functional interests") and representatives of local interests - territorial interests.

     These interests cover practically all main segments of the society and are confronted among themselves by forty councillors- four of them representing employers, four representing employees, four representing farmers, small businesses and independent professional persons, six representing non-profit making organizations and twenty-two representing local interests.

     Interests of various social groups come together in the National Council in an institutionalised way and decisions are made after the exchange of opinions on the expert level. With the intention to safeguard the high level of professionalism and to exclude political interests from the activities of the National Council the legislator has determined that the councillors besides their function they hold in the Council keep pursuing their profession falling into one of the interest groups represented in the National Council and thus keep a daily contact with the sphere they represent.

     The National council is composed in such a way to neutralize the influence of political parties that take part in the legislative procedures undertaken by the National Assembly. However, in spite of all good intentions of the legislator it cannot be said for sure that political parties have no influence whatsoever in the National Council.

     From the stated above it arises that the National Council, in contrast to the National Assembly, is not the representative of all the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia but that it represents only individual social interests. Its position and its structure thus call for a relevant electoral system that has to differ from the electoral system valid for the National Assembly. Basic differences are in the manner of elections, in the right to vote, in the role of political parties, in the system of the distribution of mandates and the terms of office.

     The National Council is formed completely by elections which means that the membership can be acquired solely by elections and not in any other way, e.g. by nomination due to a position and the like. The manner of elections of the National Council members is not regulated by the Constitution but full power is given to the legislator to regulate the matter in the law that is to be adopted by a two-third majority.

     The structure of the National Council, its position and competences call for indirect elections carried out in the relevant interest organizations and/or local communities. Indirect elections enable a closer connection between the members of interest groups and their representatives than direct elections. It is specifically for this reason that with such election the representation of political parties is not necessary which is otherwise indispensable in elections of a general representative body. As has already been mentioned, the political influence is not completely excluded from the activities of the National Council.

     The strongest influence of political parties is exercised through the councillors that represent local interests. They are elected by the representative bodies of local communities, formed on the basis of general elections where the role political parties is of decisive importance. In comparison to local interests politics, has much weaker influence on the representatives of functional interests.

     To determine the right to vote the legislator took as a basis the constitutional provision stipulating that the right to vote is the right of every citizen who has reached the age of eighteen. Contrary to the right to vote to the National Assembly, the right to vote to the National Council is not universal and equal as it is enjoyed only by the persons who are the representatives of the interest groups with a guaranteed representation in the National Council. The right to vote the members of the National Council is thus given only to the persons that pursue a relevant activity or those who are in the employment relationship in the framework of interest activities represented in the National Council and the right to vote the representatives of local interests is given to the persons that permanently reside in the constituency for these elections.

     Contrary to the right to vote to the National Assembly which is enjoyed only by the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia, also foreign citizens have the right to vote to the National Council. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia states that it can be determined by the law in which cases and under what conditions the right to vote may be given to foreign citizens. The legislator has, at the adoption of the Act on the National Council, decided to use this constitutional possibility and has granted the right to vote to the foreign citizens that permanently reside in the Republic of Slovenia or pursue a relevant activity and/or are in an employment relationship. However, their right to vote is only an active one. This means that the foreigners have the right to vote the representatives of electoral bodies and/or members of the National Council, they can be electors but are not granted the passive right to vote, they cannot be members of the National Council. The reason for this limitation is that the National Council is a state organ with important competences in the legislative field and so foreign citizens cannot be its members.

     The councillors of the National Council are, in contrast to the deputies in the National Assembly whose term of office lasts four years, elected for a five-year term. The general elections to the National Council are called by the President of the National Assembly which is in contrast to the elections to the National Assembly that are called by the President of the State. If the term of office of a councillor expires before the end of the five-year term the President of the National Assembly calls by-elections for the vacant seat in the National Council.

     Differently from the elections to the National Assembly that are carried out on Sunday or any other holiday the elections to the National Council can be carried out also on a working day. It is not necessary that the elections take place on the same day, the only condition laid down by the law is that the elections are held within the same week.

     The representative in the National Council are elected by indirect elections according to the principle of relative majority. According to this principle the mandate is given to the candidate with the highest number of votes. In the event when two or more candidates receive an equal number of votes the candidate is decided by drawing lots.

     The issue of elections of the members of individual interest groups is specially regulated by the law due to their quite different position in the interest groups.

     The elections of 18 members of the National Council - the representatives of functional interests - are carried out in electoral assemblies by electors elected by interest organizations in accordance with their rules. Each interest organization (Chamber of Commerce, Union, Association, Society and other professional organizations on a national basis) nominates into the electoral body a certain number of electors. That number depends on the total number of the members of an interest organisation. Each of these organizations elects to the electoral body one representative and an additional representative on a decided number of the members. In this way the interest organizations of employers elect an additional representative on every ten thousand members, professional organizations of farmers elect an additional representative on every thousand of the members, professional organizations of small businesses on every five hundred members, organizations of independent professions and non-profit making organizations on every hundred members.

     Every interest organization nominates one member or more as a candidate for a member of the National Council. In case that an interest organization proposes more